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DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
v. 
KENNETH KEMP, : Case No. 950293-CA 
Defendant-Appellant. Category 2 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant-Appellant Kenneth Kemp appeals from his Second Circuit Court 
conviction of Interference with Public Servant, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301(1) (1953, as amended). This Court has jurisdiction 
over Mr. Kemp's appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) and (f) (1953, 
as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 
on its face? 
2. Was Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 unconstitutionally applied to Mr. 
Kemp? 
3. Was the evidence insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Kemp committed the offense of Interference with Public Servant? 
4. Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to adequately define the 
essential element of "intimidation" in the jury instructions? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part 
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that "No State shall... deprive any person of life, hberty or property, 
without due process of law." 
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part that "All 
men have the inherent and inahenable right... to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right." 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states that "No person shall be 
deprived of life, hberty or property, without due process of law." 
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part that "No 
law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech." 
2 
The Utah Criminal Code defines the offense of Interference with Public 
Servant as follows: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence, 
intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to 
interfere with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an 
official function. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Kemp's prosecution for Interference with Public Servant arose from two 
May 1994 encounters with Brent Johnstun, a Davis County deputy constable. Mr. 
Kemp's housemate, Gretchen Graehl, had been sued by a collection agency after she 
bounced a check at a Salt Lake City bookstore.1 (R. 301). 
On May 9,1994, Mr. Johnstun went to the Kemp-Graehl home to serve a 
bench warrant for Gretchen's arrest for failure to appear.2 (R. 217-18). Mr. 
Johnstun approached Mr. Kemp, who was outside the home, and stated that he was 
looking for Ms. Graehl. Mr. Kemp stated incorrectly that she was not home, said he 
did not want to talk to Mr. Johnstun and attempted to go into his home and close the 
1
 Judgment against Mr. Graehl in the amount of $251.38 was entered on November 
23,1993. (R. 86) 
2
 The bench warrant was issued by the Layton Circuit Court on April 12,1994. 
(Exhibit P-1,R. 83) 
3 
door. (R. 217). Mr. Johnstun put his foot in the door to prevent its closing and 
informed Mr. Kemp that he had a bench warrant for Ms. Graehl's arrest. He also 
told Mr. Kemp that he was "obstructing justice." (R. 262). According to Mr. 
Johnstun, Mr. Kemp said he did not care about the bench warrant and slammed the 
door after the constable moved his foot. (R. 218). 
According to Mr. Kemp, Mr. Johnstun was wearing a gun and speaking 
loudly and appeared to be angry. (R. 316). On May 10,1994, Mr. Kemp called a 
lawyer at the Davis County Attorney's office. He wanted to know whether he could 
walk away from a constable, rather than be required to continue to talk, if he was 
not the person upon whom the constable was attempting to serve documents. (R. 
317). 
On May 11,1994, the court issued a writ of execution and praecipe 
authorizing the seizure of Ms. Graehl's 1991 Honda automobile. (Exhibit P-l; R. 
85-86). On the evening of May 12,1994, Mr. Johnstun drove to the Kemp-Graehl 
home to serve these documents and the bench warrant. As he drove up, he saw Mr. 
Kemp and Ms. Graehl in the front yard. (R. 197). He called for a tow truck and 
asked the Layton City Police Department to send an officer for back-up. (R. 198). 
According to Mr. Johnstun, Ms. Graehl went into the house as he began to 
walk up the driveway. (R. 199). Mr. Johnstun got the papers ready and approached 
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the door. (R. 200). When Ms. Graehl came outside, he gave her the writ of 
execution and began to explain that he had to take her car. (R. 200-01). According 
to Mr. Johnstun's testimony, Mr. Kemp then came over, stepped in between the two 
and said "What's going on?" (R. 201,203). Mr. Kemp also told the constable to 
direct the conversation to him rather than to Ms. Graehl, who was upset. (R. 202). 
Mr. Johnstun's 6-page statement, prepared the day after the incident, did not 
assert that Mr. Kemp stepped in between the constable and Ms. Graehl. (R. 235). 
Rather, the report stated that Mr. Kemp "interrupted and said, what's all this? I told 
him I didn't wish to speak for him and for him to stand over on the sidewalk. I 
explained the papers were for Gretchen. With this, I proceeded to explain the 
paperwork but was interrupted again." (R. 236). 
Officer Dale May of the Layton City Police Department saw the three arguing 
when he arrived at the Kemp-Graehl residence. As he walked from the car for a 
period of about 15 seconds, the officer observed Mr. Kemp talking to Mr. Johnstun. 
(R. 278).Ms. Graehl was behind and to the side of Mr. Kemp. (R. 268). Officer 
May testified that Mr. Kemp was "in Mr. Johnstun's face," (R. 274), although his 
report did not include mat statement. (R. 280-1). He did not hear Mr. Kemp 
threaten Mr. Johnstun. (R. 279). 
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As Officer May approached, Mr. Kemp told him that he had talked with a 
Davis County attorney and did not have to answer questions or say anything to the 
constable. (R. 268). Officer May told Mr. Kemp to stand to the side so that he 
could deal with Ms. Graehl and the constable. (R. 274). Mr. Kemp stood on the 
sidewalk for a while, but came back over to the group when Mr. Johnstun began to 
arrest Ms. Graehl, who "started getting hysterical and yelling." Officer May again 
told Mr. Kemp to move away, and he did as he was told. (R. 209). The officer 
testified that when he was firm, Mr. Kemp complied with his orders. (R. 283). 
Mr. Johnstun, who carries a gun when serving bench warrants and writs of 
execution, (R. 213), testified that he felt "insecure" and "threatened" because of the 
May 9 incident at the home. (R. 204-05,208). He admitted that Mr. Kemp did not 
touch him or threaten to hurt him, although he may have sworn at him. (R. 248-49). 
Officer May also testified that Mr. Kemp did not touch him or threaten him, other 
than to say that he would contact at attorney at some point in the future. (R. 294). 
On June 8,1994, an Information was filed in Layton Circuit Court charging 
Mr. Kemp with Interference with Public Servant, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-8-301. The Information alleged that the offense had been committed on May 12, 
1994. (R. 6). An Amended Information, changing the date of the offense to May 9, 
1994, was filed on September 16,1994. (R. 33). On December 15,1994, the date 
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set for trial to a jury, the City of Layton moved to amend the charges again, to return 
to the original offense date of May 12,1994. The City's motion was granted and the 
trial was continued. (R. 2). 
After substitution of defense counsel, Mr. Kemp's Motion for Bill of 
Particulars was filed on March 16,1995. (R. 77). In response the City filed an 
Amended Bill of Particulars on March 28,1995, stating that the offense occurred on 
May 12,1994 as follows: 
As constable Brant [sic] Johnstun attempted to execute an arrest 
warrant and serve a Praecipe and Writ of Execution on Gretchen 
Graehl, Defendant placed himself in between the constable and Ms. 
Graehl and yelled at the constable using foul and abusive language, 
with the purpose of intimidating the constable and interfering with the 
execution and service of the warrant and praecipe. 
(R. 79-80). 
Trial to a jury began on March 30,1995. Mr. Johnstun and Officer May 
testified for the prosecution. Mr. Kemp testified that he did not get between Mr. 
Johnstun and Ms. Graehl, or otherwise get in the constable's face. When Mr. 
Johnstun began to speak with Ms. Graehl, Ms. Kemp was petting his cats. After 
overhearing the constable say that he was going to arrest her and take her car, Mr. 
Kemp walked over to Mr. Johnstun and asked what he was doing and why. (R. 
318). Officer May arrived as Mr. Kemp was asking those questions. (R. 319). 
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Ms. Graehl also testified that Mr. Kemp did not stand in front of Mr. 
Johnstun or get in between them. (R. 303,306-07). She said that Mr. Kemp was 
not involved to any significant degree in interactions with the constable. (R. 305). 
She did not remember Mr. Kemp saying he would speak for her or that Mr. 
Johnstun did not have any authority to serve the documents and carry out their 
orders. (R. 306). Ms. Graehl's parents also testified. They contradicted testimony 
from Officer May that Mr. Kemp had walked with him and yelled comments as he 
took Ms. Graehl to his patrol car, (R. 293).3 (R. 312-13,331-32). 
At the end of the prosecution's case, Mr. Kemp reserved his right to argue 
a motion to dismiss the charge against him. (R. 300-01). In arguing the motion at 
the conclusion of the case, defense counsel contended that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
301 would be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad unless it was interpreted to 
define "interference" as requiring more than mere remonstrance, criticisms, 
interruption or distraction of a police officer. (R. 340-1). Counsel argued that there 
was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Kemp of violating the statute as properly 
construed. (R. 342). The prosecutor that Mr. Kemp could be convicted based on 
testimony that he physically placed himself between Mr. Johnstun and Ms. Graehl 
3
 The charge against Mr. Kemp was based on his interaction with Mr. Johnstun 
before Officer May arrived, and not his supposed actions when Ms. Graehl was taken into 
custody. (R. 288-89, 360). 
8 
and that he was in Mr. Johnstun's face. According to the prosecutor, that action, 
together with the words spoken by Mr. Kemp, estabhshed "intimidation." (R. 344-
45). The trial court took the Motion to Dismiss under advisement. (R. 348). 
The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Kemp guilty as charged. (R. 128). 
He was sentenced to 40 days in jail and a fine of $300, with the jail term and $100 
of the fine suspended. He was placed on probation for 12 months. (R. 4,129). 
On April 7,1995, the trial court entered an Amended Memorandum of 
Decision, denying Mr. Kemp's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 4,132). According to the 
court: 
In this case, there was more than name calling; it went beyond 
the verbal. Had Defendant stayed aside and expressed his criticism of 
what the constable was doing, we'd have had another scenario entirely. 
... Here we had more on Defendant's part. It was his physical 
interference, his repeated placing of himself between the constable and 
the person the constable was dealing with that went too far. It was the 
positioning of Defendant's person, his body, between the constable and 
Defendant's girl friend [sic] and his making statements which could 
reasonably be taken as threatening that constituted the interference. 
Defendant forced the constable either to cease doing his job or to use 
force against Defendant. A person may not impose that choice on a 
public servant attempting to carry out his responsibilities. ... 
Defendant's demeanor here was hostile and threatening. An officer is 
not required to mix it up in a street fight with a defendant's live-in 
boyfriend in order to carry out a personal property execution and a 
warrant of arrest. 
(R. 132-33). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 fails to adequately define the offense of 
Interference with Public Servant and includes conduct protected by the free speech 
clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions. The statute is vague and 
overbroad on its face. 
The application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 to convict Mr. Kemp was 
unconstitutional because it punished him for constitutionally-protected speech. 
Even taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that Mr. Kemp committed Interference with Public Servant in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301. 
The trial court committed plain error in failing to adequately define 
"intimidation," an element of the offense of Interference with Public Servant, in the 
jury's instructions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-301 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON 
ITS FACE. 
In addressing a facial challenge to the overbreadth or vagueness of a statute, a 
court must first "determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct." City of Houston v. Hill. 482 U.S. 451,458 
10 
(1987). Accord, Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 359, n.8 (1983). If a criminal 
statute is attacked, it must be examined with particular care. Criminal laws that 
punish "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held 
facially invalid even if they also have legitimate application." Hill, 482 U.S. at 459; 
accord, Kojender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8. 
In Hill and Kolender. the Court recognized the vitality of facial challenges to 
statutes affecting the right to free speech and free association. The Court explicitly 
rejected the argument that a law "should not be held unconstitutionally vague on its 
face unless it is vague in all of its possible applications."4 Kolender. 461 U.S. at 
358 n.3; accord, Hill, 482 U.S. at 459. 
Here, § 76-8-301 proscribes, inter alia, the use of "intimidation" with the 
purpose of interfering a public servant. On its face, the interference statute applies 
to constitutionally-protected conduct. In the absence of a narrowing construction, it 
authorizes the prosecution of someone who makes statements which are 
"intimidating" but nonetheless protected by the free speech clauses of the federal 
4
 Utah courts have used this language, derived from Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipsider Hoffinan Estates. Inc.. 455 U.S. 489 (1982). Greenwood y, City pf North Salt Lake, 
817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); State y Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991). 
However, as the United States Supreme Court explained, Hoffinan Estates addressed economic 
regulations, to which a less strict test applied, rather than a law which imposed criminal penalties 
in situations where free speech or free association were affected. Kolender 461 U.S. at 358 n.8. 
The Greenwood and Archamheau decisions are inconsistent with Kolender unless they are 
interpreted to include this distinction. 
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and state constitutions. On its face, the statute does not require some criminal 
action in addition to verbal "intimidation," and no such requirement has been 
announced by Utah's appellate courts. 
A. Mr. Kemp's conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-301 violates the due process clauses of the United 
States and Utah Constitutions, because the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague. 
"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness 
if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 
104,108 (1972). To withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute must satisfy two 
discrete standards. First, to provide fair warning, the law must give a person of 
ordinary intelhgence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Second, 
to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application, the law must provide explicit 
standards for law enforcement officers, prosecutors and the courts. Kolender v. 
Lawson. 461 U.S. at 357 (1983); Papaehristou v, City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
(1972); Greenwood v. Citv of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). 
Beyond these principles, "where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a 
narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by 
the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in 
other contexts." Smith v. Goguen. 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). Inadequately-defined 
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statutes chill the exercise of First Amendment rights because "uncertain meanings 
inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked'" Grayned. 408 U.S. at 109. 
A law proscribing "interference" would be unconstitutionally vague if it did 
not provide more specific definitions. State v. Bradshaw. 541 P.2d 800,803 n.5 
(Utah 1975) (Henriod, J., concurring). The offense of Interference with Public 
Servant is defined in Utah as the following: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence, 
intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to 
interfere with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an 
official function. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301(1). 
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected a vagueness challenge to § 76-8-301. 
State v. Theobald. 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982) (per curiam). Mr. Kemp contends that 
Theobald was wrongly decided. The opinion contains no analysis; it simply recites 
the first vagueness standard — whether a statute's terms tell the ordinary reader what 
is prohibited — and concludes that § 76-8-301 specifically describes the proscribed 
conduct. 645 P.2d at 51. The supreme court did not analyze the second vagueness 
standard - whether the statue provides sufficient guidelines for its enforcement by 
police, prosecutors and the courts.. 
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The United States Supreme Court has identified this second standard as the 
more important of the two. Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. at 358. In KoJendei,
 m e 
Court addressed a California statute which required persons to provide "credible 
and reliable" identification and account for their presence on the street if requested 
by the police under circumstances justifying a stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). 461 U.S. at 357. 
The California courts had defined "credible and reliable" identification to be 
that "carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing 
means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself." 461 
U.S. at 356-57. The Supreme Court held that, even with this limiting construction, 
the California statute was unconstitutionally vague. According to Justice O'Connor, 
it "contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy 
the requirement to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification. As such, the 
statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine 
whether the suspect has satisfied the statute." 461 U.S. at 358. 
In the instant case, § 76-8-301 does not define "mtimidation" and the Utah 
Supreme Court did not provide a narrowing construction in Theobald The statute 
does not adequately provide notice of what is prohibited by the proscription against 
"intimidation." Moreover, it is subject to interpretation by individual public servants 
14 
and may be applied in some situations but not other, based upon a public servant's 
feeling that he or she has been "intimidated." As a result, § 76-8-301 is 
unconstitutionally vague. 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 is overbroad in violation of 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 1 and 15 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
A statute may be invalid on its face if it is overbroad - "susceptible of 
application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments." Lewis v. City of New Orleans. 415 US. 130,134 
(1974). The defendant in Lewis was convicted of violating a New Orleans 
ordinance which made it a crime for any person "wantonly to curse or revile or to 
use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the 
city police while in the actual performance of his duty." 415 U.S. at 132. She 
allegedly yelled and cursed at a police officer who stopped a truck in which she was 
a passenger and asked the driver, her husband, for his license. 415 U.S. at 131, n.l. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, "the First Amendment 
protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police 
officers." City of Houston v. Hill. 482 U.S. at 461. As the Court explained in Hill, 
speech may be provocative or defiant, but it is "nevertheless protected against 
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censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger 
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or 
unrest." 482 U.S. at 461 (quoting Terminiellnv Chicago 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949)). 
A statute may only penalize speech considered to be within the "fighting 
words" doctrine. "Fighting words" are defined as "those words which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." They are 
not protected by the First Amendment. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132 (quoting Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).In Lewis, the New Orleans 
ordinance thus was overbroad since it could be applied to speech which, although 
offensive, did not meet the constitutional definition of "fighting words." 415 U.S. at 
134. 
The overbreadth doctrine also has been applied to a state statute punishing 
breach-of-the-peace, which was not limited to "fighting words." Gooding v. Wilson. 
405 U.S. 518 (1972). In Hill, the Court noted Justice Powell's earlier suggestion, in 
his concurring opinion in Lewis, that the "fighting words" doctrine might apply more 
narrowly to speech addressed to police officers, because they could be expected to 
react with more restraint than other citizens. 482 U.S. at 462 (citing Lewis, 415 
U.S. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring)). The ordinance in Hill made it unlawful to "in 
any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his 
16 
duty." 482 U.S. at 461. In using a broad prohibition aimed at speech, rather than 
simply punishing physical obstruction of police action, the Houston ordinance was 
unconstitutional on its face. 
Here, § 76-8-301 on its face goes beyond prohibiting physical conduct. 
Instead, the proscription against "intimidation" does not on its face require physical 
action, but criminalizes the mere utterance of words. The statute aims at speech of a 
particular content-based category - words which might "intimidate" or cause fear in 
a pubhc servant in some manner. The resulting classification of speech outlawed by 
§ 76-8-301 is subjective and does not distinguish speech protected by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Article I, Sections 1 and 15 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
II. EVEN IF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-301 IS VALID ON ITS 
FACE, ITS APPLICATION TO MR. KEMP WAS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court determines that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
301 is valid on its face, the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Mr. Kemp to 
punish him for the content of protected speech to Mr. Johnstun. As argued below, 
at its best the city's case against Mr. Kemp was that he stood between Ms. Graehl 
and Mr. Johnstun and basically said "you can't do this, what are you doing." (R. 
17 
345). The prosecutor admitted that the city's allegation that Mr. Kemp used 
intimidation was based on the statements he was making, coupled with the 
physical act of placing himself between Mr. Johnstun and Ms. Graehl. (R. 361, 
emphasis added). 
In focusing on the content of Mr. Kemp's words, constitutionally protected 
speech must be distinguished from that which can be criminalized. For example, in 
applying statutes punishing threats of death and physical injury, "only 'true threats' 
may be criminalized."5 Melugin v Hames. 38 F.3d 1478,1484 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Wafts v United States 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)). C/, Landrvv Dalev. 
280 F.Supp. 938,961-62 (N.D. HI. 1968) (State lacks a legitimate interest in 
penalizing as ''mtimidation" statements that do not reasonably tend to coerce or 
which, although alarming, are not expressions of an intent to act."). 
Here, Mr. Kemp's statements to Mr. Johnstun may have implied the belief 
that he did not have the authority to legitimately arrest Ms. Graehl or take his car. 
They also may have disparaged Mr. Johnstun and his actions. Even so, they did not 
amount to "fighting words" or to a "true threat" as those doctrines have been 
5
 "True threats" are statements which are reasonably foreseeable to be interpreted as 
a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of a person 
Melugin. 38 F 3d at 1484 Utah Code Ann § 76-8-508(2)(c), which punishes the communication 
of a threat, contains a similar limitation 
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described above. Unless these statements were reasonably likely to provoke an 
immediate breach of the peace or reasonably tended to create an apprehension of 
immediate harm, punishing Mr. Kemp for speaking them violates the First 
Amendment to the federal constitution and by Article I, Sections 1 and 15 of the 
state constitution. 
III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
MR. KEMP'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
A criminal conviction violates due process of law it is obtained based on 
evidence which does not establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to every 
essential element of the offense. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). A conviction 
may not rest upon evidence which is "sufficiently inconclusively or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,117 (Utah 1989). 
In analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and 
all of its reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v Webb. 790 
P.2d 65, 84 (Utah App. 1990). Even under this strict standard of review, the 
evidence against Mr. Kemp did not show that he was guilty of each element of the 
crime of Interference with Public Servant. 
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The offense required proof that Mr. Kemp used "intimidation" to interfere 
with Mr. Johnstun. As explained above, to comply with the state and federal 
constitutions, § 76-8-301 must be interpreted to require more than the armed 
constable's assertions that he "felt threatened" or that he believed he would not be 
able to carry out his responsibilities. This is especially true in light of his admission 
that he felt threatened "because of a previous incident at that resident." (R. 204-05). 
In that incident, on May 9,1994, Mr. Johnstun had attempted to forcibly prevent 
Mr. Kemp from closing the door to his own home and had asserted erroneously that 
he was subject to prosecution for obstructing justice. 
At most, the testimony shows that Mr. Kemp simply challenged Mr. 
Johnstun's authority and criticized him. There is no evidence to support the idea that 
it would have been reasonable for Mr. Johnstun to believe that Mr. Kemp had the 
imminent intent and ability to harm him to prevent him from acting on the bench 
warrant and writ of execution. In the absence of evidence establishing the crucial 
element of "intimidation," Mr. Kemp's conviction violates due process. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO DEFINE THE 
ELEMENT OF "INTIMIDATION" IN THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS WAS PLAIN ERROR 
Jury instructions must set forth the issues and applicable law "in a clear, 
concise and orderly manner, so that the jury will understand how to discharge its 
responsibilities." State v. Torres. 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980). "An accurate 
instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged is essential." State v. 
L a m 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980); accord, State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 
1991). 
When the defense has not objected to an erroneous jury instruction at trial, a 
showing of plain error is required. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Gibson. 908 
P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995). An error is plain if it should have been obvious to the 
trial court and it is harmful, because in its absence, there would have been a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome, or confidence in the jury's 
verdict is undermined. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
In Mr. Kemp's case, jurors were told in Instruction No. 6 that the use of 
intimidation or any other unlawful act was necessary to convict him, but 
"intimidation" was not defined. (R. 115). In Instruction No. 8, jurors were 
instructed that, to find that Mr. Kemp used intimidation with the purpose to 
interfere, they had to find that he: 
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[D]id more than remonstrate or criticize the public servant. 
Interrupting or distracting a public servant, without more, are 
insufficient to justify a finding that a person used intimidation with a 
purpose to interfere. A person is said to remonstrate when he earnestly 
presents reasons of opposition or grievance. 
(R. 117). 
In describing what was not "intimidation," Instruction No. 8 failed to provide 
a definition of this crucial term. Cf., State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254,262 (Utah 
1988) (Although it was not technically incorrect to give an instruction which did not 
affirmatively define "grave risk of death" but stated what the risk need not be, the 
term should have been defined). Here, a definition of "intimidation" could have 
been drafted using, by analogy, the definition of "communicating a threat" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c): communicating "to a person a threat that a 
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person." 
The lack of an adequate definition of the essential element of "intimidation" 
should have been obvious to the trial court. Because an appropriate instruction was 
not given, it is reasonably likely that jurors applied an incorrect view of the law to 
the facts of the case, when a jury accurately instructed about what was necessary for 
conviction would not have returned a guilty verdict. In short, the lack of an 
adequate instruction allowed Mr. Kemp's conviction on less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and for speech which was constitutionally protected. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and authorities contained in Arguments I - HI, Mr. Kemp 
requests the Court to vacate his conviction. For the reasons and authorities in 
Argument IV, Mr. Kemp asks the Court to remand the case for a new trial before a 
properly-instructed jury. 
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